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I. INTRODUCTION
It is never too early to be thinking about our constitutional future. In less
than thirty-six months, We the People will again vote for our next President and
Vice President. Well, not exactly. Under our Constitution, our votes will not
really count. We all know that we will vote for Electors who will in turn cast the
necessary votes for our next President and Vice President. Much has been writ-
ten about the Electoral College in years past and more attention has been paid to
it in months past than ever before. Suffice it to say that nobody - in the legal
academy at least - seems to like the present mode of Presidential election very
much. According to Professor Levinson, "[O]nly the most blind ancestor wor-
ship can generate any affection at all for our present scheme of electing ... our
Chief Executive."' According to Professor Amar, the Electoral College mode of
Presidential election is "a constitutional accident waiting to happen."2 But it is
Vice President, Francisco Partners. J.D., Yale Law School, 2001. For their helpful com-
ments and suggestions, thanks to Bruce Ackerman, Akhil Amar, Joel Goldstein, Kumar Kesavan,
Jennifer Koester, Sandy Levinson, Mike Paulsen, and Nick Rosenkranz. Special thanks to Rob
Alsop of the West Virginia Law Review.
I Sanford Levinson, Presidential Elections and Constitutional Stupidities, 12 CONST.
COMMENT. 183, 186 (1995).
2 Akhil Reed Amar, A Constitutional Accident Waiting to Happen, 12 CONST. COMMENT.
143, 143 (1995). Indeed, the election of President George W. Bush is Professor Amar's "consti-
tutional accident" - a President who wins the electoral vote, but loses the popular vote. The last
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also fair to say that nobody - in the legal academy or elsewhere - has found a
better mousetrap that commands public consensus, at least not just yet.
One of the many defects of the Electoral College that has received sub-
stantial scholarly attention over the years is the problem of the "faithless" Elec-
tor - the Elector who does not vote in accordance with the popular vote, but
instead exercises her own discretion to vote for the candidate of her choice.3 To
be sure, this problem received substantial popular attention in the Presidential
election of 2000: Any two faithless votes by George W. Bush electors would
have thrown the election into the House of Representatives, and any three faith-
less votes would have thrown the election to former Vice President Al Gore.4
The Constitution does not, of course, mandate that Electors vote in ac-
cordance with the popular vote. But thankfully, the faithless Elector problem has
been a very small one. Although there is no consensus on the exact number of
faithless Electors since the Founding, it appears that only a dozen or so Electors
have voted in contravention of the popular vote.5
such constitutional accidents were the elections of President Benjamin Harrison in 1888 and
President Rutherford B. Hayes in 1876. The election of President John Q. Adams in 1824 was a
slightly different "constitutional accident": Adams lost both the electoral vote and the popular
vote to Andrew Jackson, but nevertheless became President pursuant to a special contingency
election in the House of Representatives because Jackson failed to garner the requisite majority
of electoral votes. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII ("The person having the greatest number of
votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of
Electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the high-
est numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for President, the House of Represen-
tatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President."). In the Presidential election of
1828, Jackson defeated Adams handily.
3 See, e.g., JUDITH BEST, THE CASE AGAINST DIRECT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT: A
DEFENSE OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 166-90 (1971); MICHAEL J. GLEN'NON, WHEN No
MAJORITY RULES: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 31-34 (1992);
Charles L. Black, Jr., The Faithless Elector: A Contracts Problem, 38 LA. L. REV. 31 (1977);
James C. Kirby, Jr., Limitations on the Power of State Legislatures Over Presidential Elections,
27 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 495 (1962); Albert J. Rosenthal, The Constitution, Congress, and
Presidential Elections, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1968); Beverly J. Ross & William Josephson, The
Electoral College and the Popular Vote, 12 J.L. & POL. 665 (1996); Ruth C. Silva, State Law
on the Nomination, Election, and Instruction of Presidential Electors, 42 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
523 (1948); York Willbern, Discretion of Presidential Electors, 1 ALA. L. REV. 40 (1948);
Note, State Power to Bind Presidential Electors, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 696 (1965).
4 The final electoral count for President was 271 votes for George W. Bush and 266 votes for
Al Gore, see 147 CONG. REC. H44 (Jan. 6, 2001), but going into December 18, 2000 (the date
specified by federal law for the meeting and voting of the Electors in the Electoral Colleges), the
expected electoral count for President was 271 votes for Bush and 267 votes for Gore. One Gore-
Lieberman elector from the District of Columbia did not cast her votes for President and Vice
President in protest of the District's lack of statehood. See Charles Babington, Electors Reassert
Their Role; Bush Wins Vote; Protest Costs Gore, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2000, at Al.
5 See Ross & Josephson, supra note 3, at 667. The paradigm case is that of Samuel Miles, a
Federalist Elector from Pennsylvania, who in 1796 voted for Democrat-Republican Thomas
Jefferson instead of Federalist John Adams, prompting a Federalist voter to exclaim: "Do I
chuse Samuel Miles to determine for me whether John Adams or Thomas Jefferson shall be
[Vol. 104
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The constitutional question is whether the casus omissus of the Consti-
tution may be fixed short of constitutional amendment.6 Several States have
responded to the faithless Elector problem by enacting laws that purport to
"bind" Electors to vote in accordance with the popular vote; seven States have
responded to the problem by enacting laws that purport to punish Electors for
failing to do so.7 It is still an open question whether this "seemingly democratic
practice ' 8 passes constitutional muster. The Supreme Court famously reserved
the question whether Elector-binding laws are constitutional in footnote ten of
Ray v. Blair9 which affirmed the constitutionality of Alabama's enforcement of
a Democratic Party rule requiring candidates for the office of Elector to pledge
support for the Party's nominee as a condition of ballot access. °
President? No! I chuse him to act, not to think." EDWARD STANWOOD, A HISTORY OF THE
PRESIDENCY FROM 1787-1897, at 51 (1928).
6 Some individuals have formally recommended that Congress propose a constitutional
amendment to solve the problem of the faithless Elector, but Congress has not yet done so. In
1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson recommended a constitutional amendment in his State of
the Union Message. See H.R. Doc. No. 1, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965); H.R. Doc. No. 64,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1965). At least two Senators have also recommended a constitutional
amendment to solve the problem of the faithless Elector - Senators Karl Mundt and Slade Gor-
ton in 1969 and 1992, respectively. See Ross & Josephson, supra note 3, at 704 n.218.
7 See Ross & Josephson, supra note 3, at 690-91, 698.
8 Akhil Reed Amar & Vik Amar, President Quayle?, 78 VA. L. REV. 913, 944 n.88 (1992).
9 " 343 U.S. 214 (1952).
10 Q-n ;,4 111 n F Th_ prlninal aret alpinst the enmtit tinnnlitv nf ]F1 etnr-
binding laws is that such laws are plainly inconsistent with the original understanding. See, e.g.,
THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 412 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("It was
equally desirable that the immediate election should be made by men most capable of analyzing
the qualities adapted to the station and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation,
and to a judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements which were proper to govern
their choice. A small number of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens from the general
mass, will be most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to so compli-
cated an investigation."); Ray, 343 U.S., at 232 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (describing original
understanding that Electors "would be free agents, to exercise an independent and nonpartisan
judgment as to the men best qualified for the Nation's highest offices"). It is at least somewhat
of an open question whether the original understanding of 1787 is the correct original under-
standing for the purpose of evaluating the constitutionality of Elector-binding laws. The
Twelfth Amendment, which replaced Article II, § 1, clause 3, was apparently adopted in part to
vindicate majoritarian popular will. See Lolabel House, Twelfth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion of the United States 20-40 (1901) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsyl-
vania).
Scholars remain split on the difficult question whether Elector-binding laws are constitu-
tional. Professor Akhil Reed Amar once thought that Ray v. Blair "strongly suggests that states
can bind [electoral] collegians any way they choose." Amar & Amar, supra note 8, at 943 n.86.
He has since revised his position and now thinks that "the constitutionality of such [Elector-
binding] laws seems highly dubious if we consult constitutional text, history, and structure."
Akhil Reed Amar, Presidents, Vice Presidents, and Death: Closing the Constitution's Succes-
sion Gap, 48 ARK. L. REV. 215, 219 (1994). See also id. at 230 ("The Constitution plainly con-
20011
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Putting this hard constitutional question aside for the moment, I want to
draw your attention to a simpler and bigger defect in the Electoral College mode
of Presidential election - and one that has been completely overlooked by schol-
ars for over two hundred years: The problem of the "very faithless" Elector - the
Elector who does not vote in accordance with the Constitution. Careful attention
to the Oath or Affirmation Clause 1 reveals that Electors are not bound by oath
or affirmation to support the Constitution.' 2 Under our Constitution, the faithless
Elector may be very faithless! This is a first-class constitutional stupidity be-
cause Electors are responsible for electing an entire branch of Government.'
3
The Constitution somewhat circumscribes the discretion of faithless
Electors by requiring them to vote for two persons, at least one of whom must
not be an inhabitant of the same State as themselves.1 4 But where exactly does
the Constitution mandate that Electors vote for Presidential and Vice Presiden-
tial candidates who are natural born citizens of the United States and at least
thirty-five years of age, and who have been residents of the United States for at
templates that, at least formally, the electors must themselves decide upon their votes."). Pro-
fessor Vikram David Amar, his brother and sometimes co-author, is more agnostic, describing
the question as an "open one." See Vikram David Amar, The People Made Me Do It: Can the
People of the States Instruct and Coerce Their State Legislatures in the Article V Constitutional
Amendment Process?, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1037, 1089 n.233 (2000) [hereinafter Amar,
The People Made Me Do It] ("[T]he electors of the so-called electoral college may be free
agents. I say 'may' here because, on the one hand, the electoral college, like Congress and an
Article V proposing convention, is truly a national group whose existence owes entirely to the
Constitution. On the other hand, the electoral college does not 'meet' and deliberate like Con-
gress or an Article V proposing convention. The question of whether electors can be 'bound'
and be punished for breaking pledges is therefore an open one."). I agree. Even if Electors are
properly federal officers or agents (as I claim in Part III infra), it does not necessarily follow
that they may not be bound by their respective States to vote in accordance with the popular
vote.
1 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
12 See Part II infra.
13 Cf. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America.").
14 See U.S. CONST. amend. XII ("The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote
by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of
the same state with themselves."); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 ("The Electors shall meet in their respec-
tive States, and vote by Ballot for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant
of the same State with themselves."). Notably, these are the only limitations on Electors'
discretion in the Constitution. Although it may appear as though the Twelfth Amendment
inadvertently dropped the "two Persons" requirement of Article II, § 1, cl. 3, the rest of the
Twelfth Amendment makes clear that Electors must vote for persons. See U.S. CONST. amend.
XII ([T]hey shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots
the person voted for as Vice-President ..... ). It is thus fair to say that Electors cannot
"constitutionally" vote for Professor Paulsen's dog "Gus" for President or Vice President. See
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is Bill Clinton Unconstitutional? The Case for President Strom Thur-
mond, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 217, 222 (1996).
[Vol. 104
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least fourteen years?
15
The problem of the very faithless elector is not some senseless concern,
at least by historical standards. The Senate in the Sixth Congress seriously de-
bated the question of what should happen if Electors vote for persons who are
not constitutionally qualified to the office of President.' 6 And we have seen it
done before. In the election of 1872, three Electors from the State of Georgia
voted for a dead man for President - Democrat Horace Greeley who had died
after the popular election in November, but before the Electors in the Electoral
Colleges had given their votes.'
7
The critic would argue that the Elector - whose powers and duties are
conferred by the Constitution - must implicitly act pursuant to it, but it is a tru-
ism that men are not angels. 18 The Founding generation believed that the Oath
or Affirmation Clause would have real bite. The critic would also argue that an
oath or affirmation requirement to support the Constitution would not solve the
problem of the very faithless Elector, but, as we shall see, the Founding genera-
tion would have strongly disagreed. 19
A short roadmap will be helpful. In Part 1I, I set forth the constitutional
stupidity that Electors are not bound by the Oath or Affirmation Clause. In Part
III, I discuss the position of Electors in our constitutional order - whether Elec-
tors are properly officers or agents of the United States, officers or agents of the
several States, or something else. In Part IV, I discuss what the Framers and
Ratifiers would likely have said about the constitutional stupidity. And finally in
15 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 ("No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen
of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the
Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have at-
tained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United
States."); id. amend. XII ("But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President
shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States."). More precisely, the Constitu-
tion requires the President-elect and Vice President-elect to be thirty-five years of age as of the
date fixed for the beginning of their respective terms: January 20 at the time of noon. See id.
amend. XX, §§ 1, 3.
16 See 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 29 (remarks of Sen. James Ross, Jan. 23, 1800); id. at 131, 133
(remarks of Sen. Charles Pinckney, Mar. 28, 1800).
17 In all fairness, the Greeley Electors were attempting to be faithful - faithful to their
constituents who had voted for Greeley, if not faithful to the Constitution.
18 Cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("Ambition must be made to counteract ambition . I.. if men were angels, no government
would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on
government would be necessary.").
19 But what if Electors are nevertheless very faithless? Does Congress have the power - or
constitutional duty - to not count such patently unconstitutional votes? Or should the Chief
Justice simply refuse to swear in President Gus-the-Dog as Professor Paulsen has suggested?
See Paulsen, supra note 14, at 222. This is a very tricky constitutional question beyond the
scope of this Essay, and one that I have explored at considerable length elsewhere. See Vasan
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Part V, I propose a solution to the problem of the very faithless Elector that does
not require a constitutional amendment.
II. A CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITY?
For all of their virtues, the Framers were sloppy draftsmen in several re-
spects.20 They forgot to specify that the Vice President cannot preside over her
own impeachment trial. 21 They forgot to specify that the President cannot par-
don herself (no small issue these days).2 Did they also forget to specify that
Electors take an oath or affirmation to support the Constitution? The Oath or
Affirmation Clause provides:
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the
Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and
judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several
States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this
Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United
States.23
Careful textual analysis reveals-that Electors are neither (1) "Senators or
Representatives," (2) "Members of the several State Legislatures," (3) "execu-
tive and judicial Officers ... of the United States," nor (4) "executive and judi-
cial Officers ... of the several States" - and hence simply not covered by the
Oath or Affirmation Clause. A few clauses make this point.24
Article II, § 1, clause 2 provides that "[e]ach State shall appoint, in such
Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the
whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be enti-
tled in the Congress., 25 It should go without saying that Electors are not consti-
20 For a collection of thoughtful essays by leading constitutional scholars on the "stupidest
features" of the Constitution, see CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998).
21 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Someone Should Have Told Spiro Agnew, 14 CONST.
COMMENT. 245 (1997). But see Joel K. Goldstein, Can the Vice President Preside at His Own
Impeachment Trial?: A Critique of Bare Textualism, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 849 (2000).
22 See Brian C. Kalt, Note, Pardon Me?: The Case Against Presidential Self-Pardons, 106
YALE L.J. 779 (1996).
23 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
24 The textual argument that follows is a species of textual argument now known as
"intratextualism." For a rich discussion of this interpretive technique, including its history,
strengths, and weaknesses, see Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747
(1999); and Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble
With Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730 (2000).
25 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
[Vol. 104
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tutionally synonymous with "Members of the several State Legislatures." Elec-
tors may be State legislators, but need not be.z6
The Elector Incompatibility Clause that immediately follows provides
that "no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or
Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector. '"27 The Elector
Incompatibility Clause makes clear that Electors are - by definition - neither (1)
"Senator[s] or Representative[s]," nor (2) "Person[s] holding an Office of Trust
or Profit under the United States." The meaning of this latter phrase has been the
subject of much confusion in the legal academy, but the phrase is best read as
simply referring to "executive and judicial Officers ... of the United States. 2 8
Thus, for the purpose of the Oath or Affirmation Clause, Electors are neither (1)
Senators or Representatives, (2) Members of the several State Legislatures, nor
(3) Officers of the United States. So far, so good.
A handful of other clauses clinch the case that Electors are neither ex-
ecutive or judicial "Officers of the United States," nor executive or judicial "Of-
ficers ... of the several States." Electors are not appointed pursuant to the Ap-
pointments Clause which governs the appointment of executive and judicial
Officers of the United States, 29 but, as we have just seen, are appointed by the
26 Electors are no more constitutionally synonymous with State legislators than Members of
Congress are with State legislators. Members of Congress may also be State legislators, but
need not be. James Madison made this point well with respect to Representatives. See THE
FEDERALIST No. 56, at 348 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The representatives of each State...
will probably in all cases have been members, and may even at the very time be members, of the
State legislature, where all the local information and interests of the State are assembled, and
from whence they may easily be conveyed by a very few hands into the legislature of the
United States.") (emphasis added).
27 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
28 The textual argument is incredibly straightforward: A "Person holding an Office of Trust
or Profit under the United States" holds an "Office ... under the United States" and is therefore
an "Officer of the United States." History strongly confirms this reading. Senator Charles
Pinckney, Framer and leading delegate to the South Carolina ratifying convention, interpreted
the Elector Incompatibility Clause in exactly this way. See 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 387 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) [hereinafter FARRAND] (remarks of Sen.
Charles Pinckney, Mar. 28, 1800) ("The disqualifications against any citizen being an Elector,
are very few indeed; they are two. The first, that no officer of the United States shall be an
Elector; and the other, that no member of Congress shall.") (emphasis added). See also 17
CONG. REC. 815 (remarks of Sen. Sherman, Jan. 21, 1886) (interpreting Elector Incompatibility
Clause as disqualifying "members of Congress or judges of the courts or officers of the United
States") (emphasis added). The secret drafting history of the Constitution confirms this reading
too. An early draft of the Elector Incompatibility Clause provided that "Electors respectively
shall not be Members of the National Legislature, or Officers of the Union, or eligible to the
office of supreme Magistrate." 2 FARRAND, supra, at 61 (emphasis added). See also id. at 69
(motion by Elbridge Gerry and Gouverneur Morris "'that the Electors of the Executive shall not
be members of the NatI. Legislature, nor officer of the U. States, nor shall the Electors them-
selves be eligible to the (supreme) Magistracy,"' agreed to "nem. con.") (emphasis added).
29 See U.S. CONST. art. 1I, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Con-
suls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appoint-
20011
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several States pursuant to Article II, § 1, clause 2. Electors do not receive com-
missions from the President who "shall Commission all the Officers of the
United States, 30 and the President does not have the power to appoint vacant
Electors by granting commissions to them.31 In addition to these textual argu-
ments, there is one good structural argument why Electors are not executive or
judicial Officers of the United States: The purpose of the Elector Incompatibility
Clause is to ensure the independence of Electors from the Federal Govern-
ment.32 Moreover, the function performed by Electors - the function of electing
(or appointing) a President and Vice President - can hardly be fairly character-
ized as one that is "executive" or "judicial" in nature.
Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment reiterates that Electors are not
Officers of the United States, and more importantly, makes clear that Electors
are not Officers of the several States.33 The section provides in relevant part that
"[n]o person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State . . . ,,34 The contra-distinctions in this phrase
ments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the
Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in
the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.") (emphasis added).
See generally John C. Yoo, The New Sovereignty and the Old Constitution: The Chemical
Weapons Convention and the Appointments Clause, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 87 (1998) (present-
ing evidence that only Officers of the United States are appointed pursuant to the Appointments
Clause).
30 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also Steven G. Calabresi, The Political Question of Presiden-
tial Succession, 48 STAN. L. REV. 155, 159 n.24 (1995) (noting that Electors do not receive
Presidential commissions).
31 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 ("The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies
that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire
at the end of their next Session."); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 67, at 409-10 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (arguing that Recess Appointments Clause only applies
to Officers of the United States and not to Senators).
32 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 413 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (noting that Elector Incompatibility Clause "exclude[s] from eligibility to this [Electoral]
trust all those who from situation might be suspected of too great devotion to the President in
office"); JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *276 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co.
1826) [hereinafter KENT'S COMMENTARIES] (describing purpose of Elector Incompatibility
Clause as "to prevent the person in office, at the time of the election, from having any improper
influence on his re-election, by his ordinary agency in the government"). Indeed, Gouverneur
Morris even suggested at the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 that the President ought to be
impeachable for "[c]orrupting his electors." 2 FARRAND, supra note 28, at 69.
33 It should be noted that the original Constitution did not make this latter point clear. It is
therefore possible, though not likely, that section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment changed the
Constitution to make clear that Electors are not capital "0" executive and judicial Officers of
the several States. This intratextual argument highlights one of the weaknesses of intratextual-
ism - comparing and contrasting text penned at different times and by different persons.
34 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3. Note that the "constitutional stupidity" of the Oath or
Affirmation Clause is reaffirmed by this section. The section, despite its elaborate construction,
[Vol. 104
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make clear that Electors, like Senators or Representatives, do not "hold any of-
fice, civil or military, under the United States" or "hold any office, civil or mili-
tary .... under any State." Those who "hold any office, civil or military, under
the United States, or under any State" are quite sensibly Officers of the United
States and Officers of the several States, respectively.35
Thus, for the purposes of the Oath or Affirmation Clause, Electors are
neither (1) Senators or Representatives, (2) Members of the several State Legis-
latures, (3) executive or judicial Officers of the United States, nor (4) executive
or judicial Officers of the several States. Electors are not covered by the Oath or
Affirmation Clause. Q.E.D.
III. WHAT OFFICE Do ELECTORS OCCUPY IN OUR CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER?
So if Electors are neither (1) Senators or Representatives, (2) Members
of the several State Legislatures, (3) executive or judicial Officers of the United
States, nor (4) executive or judicial Officers of the several States, what are they
then?
In Bush v. Gore,36 Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his concurring opinion
joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, wrote, "'While presidential electors are
not officers or agents of the federal government (In re Green, 134 U.S. 377,
379), they exercise federal functions under, and discharge duties in virtue of
authority conferred by, the Constitution of the United States.'"
37
This is, with all due respect, incorrect, If Electors are not officers or
agents of the United States, they must, in a constitutional system of dual sover-
eigns, be officers or agents of the several States or occupy no offices of constitu-
tional ianificranc- at ail As we he seenec rare... . officers or a
the several States, and there is good reason to believe that Electors occupy of-
does not disqualify "rebellious" Electors from Federal or State office:
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President
and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or
under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or
as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an ex-
ecutive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United
States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid
or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each
House, remove such disability.
Id. It is probably not fair to heap blame on the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment who were
merely copying the Oath or Affirmation Clause.
35 See also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 ("The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of
the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Trea-
son, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.") (emphasis added).
36 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
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fices of constitutional significance. The office of Elector is created by the Con-
stitution, and the Constitution mandates their existence. Is it really so clear that
Electors are not officers or agents of the United States?
Chief Justice Rehnquist should not be singled out for any error. In the
case of In re Green,38 cited by the Chief Justice, the Supreme Court held that
[a]lthough the electors are appointed and act under and pursuant
to the constitution of the United States, they are no more offi-
cers or agents of the United States than are the members of the
state legislatures when acting as electors of federal senators, or
the people of the states when acting as electors of representa-
tives in congress.39
In re Green has been cited for the proposition that Electors are Officers of the
several States - a virtual non sequitur.4° The confusion extends to at least two
scholars in the legal academy who incorrectly believe that "[r]elevant constitu-
tional provisions imply that electors are state, not federal, officers. 41
The holding of In re Green is incorrect. In the cases of the election of
Senators or Representatives, election occurs directly, not indirectly through an
intermediate body created by the Constitution for a specified purpose. Electors
are more like Members of Congress than Members of State Legislatures in elect-
ing Senators (prior to the Seventeenth Amendment) or the People of the several
States in electing Senators and Representatives - an analogy that will prove to
be especially illuminating in short order. Electors in the Electoral Colleges do
"meet" and deliberate like Members of Congress.42 Indeed, the Electoral Col-
38 134 U.S. 377 (1890).
39 Id. at 379.
40 See, e.g., Walker v. United States, 93 F.2d 383, 388 (8th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303
U.S. 644 (1938); Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1975), affid in part and rev'd
in part on other grounds per curiam, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Hadnott v. Amos, 295 F. Supp. 1003,
1013 (M.D. Ala. 1968) (per curiam), rev'd on other grounds, 394 U.S. 358 (1969).
41 Ross & Josephson, supra note 3, at 692.
42 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XII ("The Electors shall meet in their respective states and
vote by ballot for President and Vice-President .... ) (emphasis added); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3
(similar); THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 412 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("It was equally desirable that the immediate election should be made by men most capable of
analyzing the qualities adapted to the station and acting under circumstances favorable to delib-
eration, and to a judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements which were proper
to govern their choice.") (emphasis added); id. ("[A]s the electors, chosen in each State, are to
assemble and vote in the State in which they are chosen, this detached and divided situation
will expose them less to heats and ferments, which might be communicated from them to the
people, than if they were all to be convened at one time, in one place.") (emphasis added); cf.
Amar, The People Made Me Do It, supra note 10, at 1089 n.233 ("[T]he electoral college, like
Congress and an Article V proposing convention, is truly a national group whose existence
owes entirely to the Constitution. On the other hand, the electoral college does not 'meet' and
deliberate like Congress or an Article V proposing convention.").
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leges may properly be thought of as a special "Congress" created by the Consti-
tution for the single and singular purpose of electing the President. Most impor-
tantly, the function performed by Electors, like that performed by Members of
Congress, is distinctly national - unlike that performed by Members of State
Legislatures in electing Senators (prior to the Seventeenth Amendment) or the
People of the several States in electing Senators and Representatives. Electors
cast their votes for persons who represent We the People of the United States,
not We the People of any single State. Recall also that the Constitution requires
that the Electors of each State vote for at least one person who is not an inhabi-
tant of the same State as themselves.43 Indeed, the Framers briefly considered a
motion to compensate Electors out of the National Treasury for their "national
service" which passed without discussion, but was inexplicably dropped on sub-
sequent debate.44
The right answer, I submit, is that Electors, like Members of Congress,
hold a "public Trust under the United States." This phrase has been the subject
of much confusion in the legal academy, but it is well settled that Members of
Congress hold a "public Trust under the United States. 45 It should be noted that
a "public Trust under the United States" is not the same thing as an "Office of
Trust or Profit under the United States," even though the word "Trust" appears
in both phrases. Members of Congress hold a "public Trust under the United
States" and are little "0" officers or agents of the United States in every sense,
but Members of Congress are just not capital "0" "Officers of the United
States" who hold an "Office of Trust or Profit under the United States." 4
43 U.S. CONST. amend. XII; see also id. art. II, § I, cl. 3. At the Philadelphia Convention of
1787, Hugh Williamson, who supported direct election of the President by the people of the
several States, suggested that electors vote for three candidates, two of whom at least who
should not be an inhabitant of the same State as themselves. See 2 FARRAND, supra note 28, at
113. Gouverneur Morris and James Madison thought that this proposal was a good one. See id.
at 113-14.
44 See 2 FARRAND, supra note 28, at 73 (motion of Hugh Williamson).
45 See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 903 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing) (reading Religious Test Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3) ("I know of no one else who
holds a 'public Trust under the United States' [other than Senators and Representatives] .... ").
Justice Thomas was right, but not completely right - as I shall try to convince you, Electors
also occupy a "public Trust under the United States."
For early evidence strongly suggesting that Members of Congress hold a "public Trust
under the United States," see, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 316 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) (referring to nature of legislative department's "public trust"); THE
FEDERALIST No. 56, at 346 (James Madison) (referring to "due performance of the legislative
trust"); THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 350 (James Madison) (referring to "public trust" of Repre-
sentatives); id. at 351 (referring to "representative trust"); THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 376
(James Madison) (referring to "senatorial trust"); id. at 379 (referring to "legislative trust");
THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 383 (James Madison) (stating that Senate is "durably invested with
public trust"); id. at 386 (referring to "legislative trust"); and THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 426
(Alexander Hamilton) (seemingly distinguishing "public trust" and "office").
46 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. This point is readily apparent upon a close parsing of the
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So too Electors hold a "public Trust under the United States." In The
Federalist No. 68, Alexander Hamilton observed that Electors occupy a "trust,"
but admittedly did not elaborate that Electors occupy a public Trust under the
United States.47 The analogy between Electors and Members of Congress with
respect to office-holding becomes crisper when we remember that the original
mode of Presidential election was by Congress.48 The Electoral College mode of
Presidential election is the substitution of one set of officers or agents of the
United States for another (perhaps not coincidentally precisely equal in num-
ber).
text of the Constitution. The Elector Incompatibility Clause contra-distinguishes "Senator or
Representative" and "Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States." U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. The Oath of Affirmation Clause contra-distinguishes "Senators and
Representatives" and "all executive and judicial Officers ... of the United States." U.S. CONST.
art. VI, cl. 3. Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment contra-distinguishes "Senator or Repre-
sentative in Congress" and those who "hold any office, civil or military, under the United
States," and more clearly, contra-distinguishes "member of Congress" and "officer of the
United States." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3.
There is more to be said than a series of contra-distinctions. The Emoluments Clause
provides that "[n]o Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected,
be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been
created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time," and squarely
suggests that Members of Congress may not be civil Officers of the United States. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 6, cl. 2. The Incompatibility Clause provides that "no Person holding any Office under
the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office," and
squarely suggests that Officers of the United States may not be Members of Congress. Id.
Finally, and most conclusively, Members of Congress are not civil Officers of the United
States, for otherwise they would be subject to impeachment pursuant to U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4
("The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed
from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes
and Misdemeanors."). It should go without saying that Members of Congress are not subject to
impeachment by the House of Representatives or conviction of impeachment by the Senate,
notwithstanding the impeachment of Senator William Blount by the House of Representatives
in 1797 and his acquittal by the Senate in 1798. See also, e.g., 4 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 33 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1888) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S
DEBATES] (remarks of Governor Samuel Johnson at North Carolina ratifying convention); id. at
34 (remarks of Archibald Maclaine at North Carolina ratifying convention); id. at 127 (remarks
of future Justice James Iredell at North Carolina ratifying convention); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 290 (2d ed. 1988).
For additional discussion that Members of Congress are not "Officers of the United
States" who hold an "Office of Trust or Profit under the United States," see Akhil Reed Amar
& Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential Succession Law Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV.
113, 114-17 (1995).
47 THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 413 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("And
they [the convention] have excluded from eligibility to this trust all those who from situation
might be suspected of too great devotion to the President in office."). See also 3 FARRAND,
supra note 28, at 623 (Alexander Hamilton's private, unadopted draft of the Constitution) (re-
ferring to "the execution of their trust").
48 See 2 FARRAND, supra note 28, at 32, 134, 171, 185, 401 (providing for election of
President by the Congress).
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The point may be best seen by deductive reasoning. If Electors are nei-
ther (1) Members of Congress, (2) Members of the several State Legislatures,
(3) executive or judicial Officers of the United States, nor (4) executive or judi-
cial Officers of the several States, Electors must hold a public Trust under the
United States - unless we are willing to place Electors in the position of ordi-
nary citizens of the United States. 49 The Supreme Court did get at least one thing
right in Bush v. Gore: Electors "exercise federal functions under, and discharge
duties in virtue of authority conferred by, the Constitution of the United
States.,,50 Thus, Electors, like Members of Congress, are properly officers or
agents of the United States, but they are simply not "Officers of the United
States.""'
The problem, of course, is that the Oath or Affirmation Clause is under-
inclusive - the clause does not apply to all those who hold a public trust under
the United States, but only applies to Senators and Representatives.52
IV. WHAT WOULD THE FRAMERS AND RATIFIERS HAVE SAID?
The constitutional stupidity is not just wooden textualism. It is remark-
able because the Founding generation believed the Oath or Affirmation Clause
to be of critical, if not grave importance. According to Professor Paulsen, "The
Oath Clause had a profound, almost covenantal, significance for the framers - a
significance that may be difficult for some fully to understand and appreciate
today. 53
49 It is also possible, though most unlikely, that Electors occupy an office of their own
colsttuionll signi i ance - the office of Elector.
50 531 U.S., at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
51 One consequence of the textual exegesis is that Electors, like Members of Congress, are
not subject to impeachment by the House of Representatives or conviction of impeachment by
the Senate. This is for good reason - to ensure the independence of Electors. Does the lack of
impeachment of Electors mean that Electors who act unconstitutionally - say by voting for
Professor Paulsen's dog "Gus" - may never be disqualified from future service as an Elector?
No, not necessarily. States may perhaps place some disqualifications on the federal office of
Elector, just as States may place some qualifications on the same. See infra note 81.
52 See also Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute
the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 567 (1994) (stating that the Oath or Affirmation Clause "explic-
itly refers to, and clearly contemplates, only three types of federal officers or personnel" -
"members of Congress, executive officers, and judicial officers"). The Religious Test Clause -
juxtaposed with the Oath or Affirmation Clause - is, however, not under-inclusive in the same
sense as the Oath or Affirmation Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 ("[B]ut no religious
Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United
States."). If Electors hold "any Office ... under the United States" or "any . . . public Trust
under the United States," it follows that neither the United States nor the several States may
place any religious qualifications on the office of Elector.
53 Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the
Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 257 (1994) (emphasis added). Indeed, the oath or affirmation re-
quirement was of profound significance to the citizenry at large: "Earlier generations believed
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We need only look to the Constitution itself for rich evidence of this
proposition. All in all, no less than five clauses of the Constitution employ or
rely on the oath or affirmation concept: The Oath or Affirmation Clause 54 and
section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment,55 as previously mentioned, as well as
the Senate Impeachment Clause,56 the Presidential Oath or Affirmation Clause,57
and the Fourth Amendment.58
The Constitution broke no new ground in this regard. It should come of
little surprise that every early state constitution contained some form of oath or
affirmation requirement for office-holders. 59 The ubiquity of the oath or affirma-
tion requirement strongly suggests that the Founding generation did not consider
it to be merely precatory.
Much historical evidence confirms this supposition. In The Federalist
No. 27, Alexander Hamilton referred to the "sanctity of an oath" taken pursuant
to the Oath or Affirmation Clause.6° James Monroe observed at the Virginia
ratifying convention that "[t]he influence which the sanction of oaths has on
men is irresistible. The religious authority of divine revelation will be quoted to
prove the propriety of adhering to it, and will have great influence in disposing
men's minds to maintain it."'61 So too Chief Justice Marshall relied upon the
significance of the judicial oath in the Oath or Affirmation Clause in support of
that [courtroom] perjury was a mortal sin, resulting in eternal damnation: better to admit mur-
der than commit perjury under oath." AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, FIRST PRINCIPLES 73 (1997).
54 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
55 Id. amend. XIV, § 3.
56 Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 ("The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When
sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation.").
57 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 7 ("Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the
following Oath or Affirmation:- 'I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute
the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect
and defend the Constitution of the United States."'). For a discussion of the special importance
of the prolix Presidential Oath or Affirmation Clause, see Paulsen, supra note 53, at 261-62;
and Joel K. Goldstein, The Presidency and the Rule of Law: Some Preliminary Explorations, 43
ST. Louis U. L.J. 791, 828-29 (1999).
58 U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.").
59 See Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA.
L. REV. 1559, 1631-32 (1989).
60 THE FEDERALIST No. 27, at 177 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). See
also THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 396 (John Jay) ("Every consideration that can influence the
human mind, such as honor, oaths, reputations, conscience, the love of country, and family
affections and attachments, afford security for [the] fidelity [of the President and Senate in
treaty-making].") (emphasis added).
61 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 46, at 216-17.
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his case for judicial review in Marbury v. Madison.62 Pointing to the clause,
Chief Justice Marshall asked, "Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties
agreeably to the constitution of the United States, if that constitution forms no
rule for his government? If it is closed upon him, and cannot be inspected by
him?" 63 And early constitutional commentator William Rawle observed that the
"promissory oath" of the Oath or Affirmation Clause "greatly increases the
moral obligation of the party, and ought to make a deep impression on him."
64
Along these lines, and according to one scholar, the Oath or Affirmation Clause
was added to the Constitution "[b]ecause the obligation of the Supremacy
Clause was not enough to ensure the viability of the Constitution.
65
The constitutional stupidity is, however, especially remarkable when
considered in the context of Presidential election. The Constitution places a spe-
cial emphasis on authenticity and secrecy in the Electoral Colleges. The Elec-
toral College Clauses provide that "[t]he Electors shall meet in their respective
states," instead of at some central location such as the Seat of the Government
of the United States.66 The purpose of this provision is to reduce the risk of ca-
bal and corruption in Presidential election.67 The Electoral College Clauses also
62 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
63 Id. at 180. As has been widely remarked, this is perhaps the strongest textual argument
against Chief Justice Marshall's position because Members of Congress and executive Officers
of the United States are also bound by the Oath or Affirmation Clause. For another famous
Marshall Court opinion stressing the importance of the oath, see McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 416 (1819) (authorizing Congress to "superadd, to the oath directed by the
constitution, such other oath of office as its wisdom might suggest").
64 WILLIAM RAWLE. A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES Or A MER A 191,
(2d ed. 1829).
65 Nash E. Long, The "Constitutional Remand": Judicial Review of Constitutionally
Dubious Statutes, 14 J.L. & POL. 667, 677 (1998). In my view, the point is a stretch, but the
spirit of the point is a good one.
66 U.S. CONST. amend. XII; see also id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (same with minor differences in
capitalization).
67 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 412 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("Nothing was more to be desired [in the Electoral College mode of Presidential election]
than that every practicable obstacle should be opposed to cabal, intrigue, and corruption."); 4
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 46, at 122 (remarks of William Davie at North Carolina ratifying
convention) ("He is elected on the same day in every state, so that there can be no possible
combination between the electors."); id. at 105 (remarks of James Iredell at North Carolina
ratifying convention) ("Had the time of election been different in different states, the electors
chosen in one state might have gone from state to state, and conferred with the other electors,
and the election might have been thus carried on under undue influence. But by this provision,
the electors must meet in the different states on the same day, and cannot confer together. They
may not even know who are the electors in the other states. There can be, therefore, no kind of
combination. It is probable that the man who is the object of choice of thirteen different states,
the electors in each voting unconnectedly with the rest, must be a person who possesses, in high
degree, the confidence and respect of his country."); 3 FARRAND, supra note 28, at 461 (re-
marks of Sen. Rufus King, Mar. 18, 1824) ("[M]embers of the General Convention . . . did
indulge the hope, by apportioning, limiting, and confining the Electors within their respective
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provide that the Electors in each Electoral College shall "vote by ballot" and
that "they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the govern-
ment of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate" the electoral
certificate.68 The purpose of this provision is to also to reduce the risk of cabal
and corruption in Presidential election and to ensure the independence of Elec-
tors.69 The emphasis on authenticity and secrecy in the Electoral College
Clauses is understandable - only Electors are directly responsible for choosing
an entire branch of government. Thus, the constitutional stupidity is really stu-
pid when considered in context.
In the Framers' defense, it might be said that they overlooked the con-
stitutional stupidity because they thought that almost all Presidential elections
would be decided by the House of Representatives whose members would be on
oath or affirmation in choosing the President.70 The better answer is that the
Electoral College mode of Presidential election was indeed a last-minute com-
promise in September of 1787 between those who advocated direct popular
election of the President and those who advocated a parliamentary-style election
by Congress, and that the Framers simply forgot to amend a previously drafted
Oath or Affirmation Clause agreed to in July of 1787. 7'
States, and by the guarded manner of giving and transmitting the ballots of the Electors to the
Seat of Government, that intrigue, combination, and corruption, would be effectually shut out,
and a free and pure election of the President of the United States made perpetual."); KENT'S
COMMENTARIES, supra note 32, at *280 ("These electors assemble in separate and distantly
detached bodies, and they are constituted in a manner best calculated to preserve them free
from all inducements to disorder, bias, or corruption.").
68 U.S. CONST. amend. XII; see also id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (same with minor differences in
capitalization). This provision stands in stark contrast to several clauses of the Constitution that
stress transparency and publicity. See, e.g., id. art. I, § 5, cl. 3 (Journal of Proceedings Clause);
id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (Receipts and Expenditures Clause); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (Opinion Clause);
id. art. II, § 3 (State of the Union Clause); id. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 (Treason Clause).
69 See, e.g., 10 ANNALS OFCONG. 144 (remarks of Senator Charles Pinckney, Mar. 28, 1800)
("As the Constitution directs they are to vote by ballot, the votes of the election ought to be
secret. You have no right to require from an Elector how he voted, nor will you be able to know
for whom he did vote, particularly if in the return from that State different candidates have been
voted for.").
70 See 2 FARRAND, supra note 28, at 500 (remarks of George Mason) ("[N]ineteen times in
twenty the President would be chosen by the Senate ...."); id. at 512 (remarks of George Ma-
son) ("[lit will rarely happen that a majority of the whole votes will fall on any one candidate..
' ."); THE FEDERALIST No. 66, at 404 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The
same house [House of Representatives] will be the umpire in all elections of the President
which do not unite the suffrages of the majority of the whole number of electors; a case which
it cannot be doubted will sometimes, if not frequently, happen."); MAX FARRAND, THE
FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 168 (1913) (reporting that George Ma-
son claimed at the Virginia ratifying convention that Electors would fail to make a choice in
"forty-nine times out of fifty").
71 The basic structure of the Oath or Affirmation Clause was agreed to on July 23, 1787. See
2 FARRAND, supra note 28, at 87-88. The clause featured prominently in early drafts of the
Constitution. See, e.g., id. at 133 (Committee of Detail, I draft); id. at 159-160 (Committee of
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V. WHAT SHALL WE Do ABOUT THE VERY FAITHLESS ELECTOR?
You might at this point be thinking why we should do anything at all.
Perhaps you think that Congress has the power - or constitutional duty - not to
count the votes of very faithless Electors who vote in contravention of the Con-
stitution. Indeed, Congress has decided that it may refuse to count electoral
votes that are not "regularly given" pursuant to the Electoral Count Act of
1887,72 but it is far from clear whether this law is constitutional and whether
Congress may refuse to count electoral votes given by very faithless Electors."
Why leave these tricky matters to Congress anyway? Our Constitution,
after all, requires Members of Congress to take an oath or affirmation to support
the Constitution instead of simply relying on Article III judges. What matters
now is that the Founding generation would have first looked to the oath or af-
firmation requirement - and not to Congress - as a means to check the very
faithless Elector. Indeed, the Founding generation would ostensibly have looked
to Congress last given that the purpose of the Electoral College mode of Presi-
dential Election is to remove Congress from the business of electing the Presi-
dent as much as possible.74 The critic would argue that the oath or affirmation
requirement does not have much significance in today's secular society, but this
is not the spirit of our Constitution. The critic would also argue that the oath or
affirmation requirement will never prevent the very faithless Elector from voting
in contravention of the Constitution, but it is surely better to have an oath or
affirmation requirement than not.
So what shall we do then about the very faithless Elector? Is there a so-
lution short of amending the Oath or Affirmation Clause by constitutional
amendment?
Unfortunately, we cannot look to Congress to remedy the Framers'
drafting oversight because Congress lacks the constitutional authority to pre-
Detail, VIII draft). The clause was not substantively changed and was never the subject of re-
corded debate. The basic structure of the Electoral College mode of Presidential election was
proposed by the Committee of Eleven on September 4, 1787, and was agreed to on the next
day. See id. at 497-98, 511-15.
72 For the relevant statutory provision, see 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
73 Elsewhere, I have argued that the Electoral Count Act is unconstitutional, and that
Congress (or more precisely, the joint convention of Senators and Representatives assembled
for the purpose of the electoral count) has no power not to count electoral votes given by very
faithless Electors. See Kesavan, supra note 19.
74 See, e.g., 2 FARRAND, supra note 28, at 497-502 (proposing Electoral College mode of
Presidential election in lieu of Presidential election by Congress); 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 29
(remarks of Sen. Charles Pinckney, Jan. 23, 1800) ("He remembered very well that in the Fed-
eral Convention great care was used to provide for the election of the President of the United
States, independently of Congress; to take the business as far as possible out of their hands....
Nothing was more clear to him than that Congress had no right to meddle with it at all; as the
whole was entrusted to the State Legislatures, they must make provision for all questions aris-
ing on the occasion.").
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scribe an oath or affirmation requirement for Electors. The First Congress con-
fronted the very tricky problem of defining and administering the oath or affir-
mation required by the Oath or Affirmation Clause to "Members of the several
State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers . . . of the several
States. 75 Congress could not rely on the Necessary and Proper Clause which
gives Congress the power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof' 76 because the Oath or Affirmation Clause is not
one of the "Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States" and because State legislators and officers are not "Officers of the United
States. 77 After significant debate in the House of Representatives, the First
Congress simply concluded that the Oath or Affirmation Clause was "self-
executing" and decided to specify the oath or affirmation (including the time
and manner) for State legislators and officers anyway.78 This solution does not
work here. The Oath or Affirmation Clause cannot be "self-executing" with
respect to a class of constitutional actors that the clause omits entirely.
Fortunately, there is a solution to the problem of the very faithless Elec-
tor short of constitutional amendment. We can look to the several States to fix
the Framers' drafting oversight. Each State may easily prescribe an oath or af-
firmation requirement in appointing its Electors pursuant to Article II, § 1,
clause 2.7 9 The oath or affirmation requirement is undoubtedly a "qualification"
for office-holding, 80 and the Supreme Court has squarely held that the States
75 See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The First Congress and the Structure
of Government, 1789-1791, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 161, 169-71 (1995); Kent
Greenfield, Original Penumbras: Constitutional Interpretation in the First Year of Congress,
26 CONN. L. REv. 79, 111-15 (1993) (building on Professor Currie's then-unpublished manu-
script).
76 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
77 See Currie, supra note 75, at 170-71; Greenfield, supra note 75, at 113. Representative
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts was the first to raise this constitutional objection in the House
of Representatives. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 277-78 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
78 Act of June 1, 1789, ch. 1, § 4, 1 Stat. 23, 23-24. This was the first act passed by the First
Congress - further underscoring the importance of the Oath or Affirmation Clause.
79 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 ("Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representa-
tives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress.").
80 The Religious Test Clause and its juxtaposition with the Oath or Affirmation Clause
crisply reflects this understanding. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3 ("[B]ut no religious Test shall
ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.")
(emphasis added). The religious test for office-holding at the Founding was commonly given as
an oath or affirmation. See, e.g., 2 FARRAND, supra note 28, at 342 ("No religious test or quali-
fication shall ever be annexed to any oath of office under the authority of the U. S."); 3 id. at
310 (remarks of Governor Edmund Randolph at the Virginia ratifying convention) ("The exclu-
sion of religious tests is an exception from this general provision, with respect to oaths, or af-
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may set qualifications for the office of Elector that pass general constitutional
muster.8' Some States may have enacted laws that require Electors to take an
oath or affirmation to support the Constitution, but all States should do so before
November 2, 2004 - the next date specified by federal law for the choosing of
Electors.82 This is one sorely needed improvement to the Electoral College
mode of Presidential election that is faithful both to our Constitution and its
vision of federalism - and, importantly, one that does not require us to crank up
the elaborate machinery of Article V super-majorities at both the Federal and
State levels.
VI. CONCLUSION
What shall we make of the problems of the faithless and very faithless
Elector? We have ignored the simpler and bigger problem of potential faithless-
ness for too long. The problem of the very faithless Elector suggests that the
Electoral College mode of Presidential selection is importantly flawed, and
flawed from the start. The solution to the problem of the very faithless Elector -
like that to the faithless Elector - is merely one of rearranging the deck chairs on
the Titanic. These problems are but two of the many defects of the current sys-
tem of how we elect the President and Vice-President. It is high time to seri-
ously debate the entire Electoral College mode of Presidential election well in
advance of an impending constitutional crisis.
firmations. Although officers, &c. are to swear that they will support this constitution, yet they
are not bound to support one mode of worship, or to adhere to one particular sect."); Letter
from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Apr. 10, 1788), reprinted in 3 id. at 297 (referring
to "an oath involving a religious test as a qualification for office").
81 See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 861 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing) ("[T]he States may establish qualifications for their delegates to the electoral college, as
long as those qualifications pass muster under other constitutional provisions (primarily the
First and Fourteenth Amendments).") (citing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968) and
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27-36 (1892)).
82 See 3 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) ("The electors of President and Vice President shall be appointed,
in each State, on the Tuesday next after the first Monday in November, in every fourth year
succeeding every election of a President and Vice President.").
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